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According to standard economic theory, markets underprovide public goods
owing to the free-rider problem. Experimental and ﬁeld evidence suggests
otherwise, but the observed outcome is typically suboptimal (e.g., Ledyard
1995). Since the provision of public goods inﬂuences the functioning and
well-being of our societies, social scientists and policy makers strive to ﬁnd
mechanisms that could propel individuals towards the social optimum.
In the context of any particular public goods production technology, the
players’ behavior depends on the choice of values for the various environ-
mental and design variables. Koukoumelis et al. (2009) have recently shown
that one-way communication, or more speciﬁcally a free-form text message
sent by one group member to his co-players before contribution decisions
are made, enhances eﬃciency in linear voluntary contribution mechanisms
(VCMs). Thus, investigating the robustness of this communication method
as a mechanism for facilitating cooperation is important in understanding
how to alleviate the free-rider problem.
The experimental research on one-way communication has so far involved
players that receive equal laboratory endowments. It is possible that the
eﬃciency-enhancing properties of one-way communication hinge upon the
endowments’ homogeneity. In fact, the experimental literature on VCMs
provides evidence that heterogeneity deters cooperation both when commu-
nication is not allowed (e.g., Cherry et al. 2005;Buckley and Croson 2006)
and when group members can communicate face-to-face (Isaac and Walker
1988).1
In what follows we explore the eﬀectiveness of one-way communication in
fostering contributions in the presence of heterogeneously endowed players.
Conditionally cooperative preferences (for a survey, see G¨ achter 2007) can
transform the social dilemma game into a coordination game with multiple
Pareto-ranked equilibria (e.g., Sen 1967). Insofar as the communicator is
able to draw the group’s attention to an equal payoﬀs (rather than an equal
contributions) rule, the above kind of heterogeneity should not be relevant
to the eﬀects of one-way communication.2
1While in linear settings the eﬀect of introducing heterogeneous endowments on average
contributions is unequivocally negative, experiments conducted in non-linear environments
suggest that the eﬀect of heterogeneity on contributions could be neutral or even positive
(e.g. Chan et al. 1996; 1999).
2The premise that the communicator’s cheap talk increases the amount of eﬃcient play
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The experimental design builds on Koukoumelis et al. (2009) in order to
facilitate comparisons. Groups of size 4 interact for 10 periods in a partners
design. At the beginning of every period, each player 𝑖 is endowed with
an income of 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ECU (Experimental Currency Units) which he can either
consume privately or contribute to a public good. Individual endowments
are asymmetric: two “rich” members are endowed with 30 ECU and two
“poor” members with 20 ECU (the total group endowment in each period
is therefore 100 ECU, as in Koukoumelis et al.). The endowments remain
constant throughout the game and are commonly known.
Let 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 denote individual 𝑖’s contribution to the public good in period 𝑡
(with 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑒𝑖,𝑡)a n d𝐶𝑡 =
∑4
𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗,𝑡 be the total amount of public good
provided. The monetary payoﬀ per period of each 𝑖 is given by
𝜋𝑖,𝑡(𝑐𝑖,𝑡,𝐶 𝑡)=( 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡)+0 .4 𝐶𝑡.
Since the marginal per capita return is less than unity, the dominant strategy
for a monetary payoﬀ maximizer is to contribute nothing. On the other
hand, it is socially eﬃcient to contribute everything.
We study two treatments that build on the basic game described above.
In the baseline treatment (𝐵𝐴), the group members cannot communicate
with each other: in each period, they decide simultaneously and privately
on the number of ECU that they wish to contribute to the public good. In
the communication treatment (𝐶𝐴), one member of each group is randomly
appointed communicator at the beginning of the game, a role that he retains
throughout the experiment. Prior to each period, the communicator has a
maximum of four minutes to compose a message and send it to his co-
players. In principle, the form of the message is free, the only restrictions
to its content being that the communicator can neither identify himself, nor
threaten the other group members, nor promise side-payments.3
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and con-
ducted in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Eco-
nomics (Jena, Germany). The subjects were undergraduate students from
in coordination games is consistent with theory and experimental evidence (Cooper et al.
1992; Farrell and Rabin 1996; Crawford 1998; Charness 2000).
3With the aim of enforcing compliance with these restrictions, all messages were
screened before being sent.
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they were randomly assigned to visually isolated computer terminals. The
instructions (which are reproduced in the supplement) were distributed and
then read aloud to establish public knowledge. Before starting the exper-
iment, subjects had to answer a control questionnaire which tested their
comprehension of the rules. In both treatments, at the end of each period
the players received feedback on the number of ECU contributed by each
group member, the income from the project, and their corresponding payoﬀ.
We implemented an exchange rate of 10 ECU = 50 euro cents. The average
earnings per subject were e19.62 (inclusive of a e2.50 show-up fee).
We ran two sessions per treatment. Each session involved 32 partici-
pants. With group size equal to 4, we have 16 independent observations per
treatment.
3 Experimental results
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the average group contributions. The
series’ measures of location increase in response to the introduction of one-
way communication. On the other hand, its variation decreases, provided
that we acknowledge the presence of outliers and consider a robust measure
of spread (like the median absolute deviation).
[Table 1 about here.]
Figure 1 depicts the time paths of the means of the average group con-
tributions. For the reader’s convenience, we present as well the outcome of
the symmetric-endowment treatments: 𝐵𝑆 (𝐶𝑆) corresponds to 𝐵10 (𝐶𝐶)i n
Koukoumelis et al. (2009). Treatment 𝐵𝐴 replicates standard ﬁndings: the
mean of average group contributions starts above the series’ overall mean
a n df o l l o w sad o w n w a r dt r e n d .I nc o n t r a s t ,t h e𝐶𝐴 mean of average group
contributions starts at a notably higher level and remains fairly stable in all
periods but the last. A one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test (𝑊)w i t hm e a n
group contributions averaged over all 10 periods as independent observation
units conﬁrms that contributions in 𝐶𝐴 are signiﬁcantly higher than in 𝐵𝐴
(𝑝 =0 .00). This result is consistent with our main hypothesis on the eﬃ-
cacy of one-way communication. Additionally, contributions are higher in
𝐶𝑆 than in 𝐶𝐴, but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (𝑝 =0 .36;two-sided 𝑊).
4
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Figure 2 graphs the average relative contribution (that is contribution
divided by endowment) of poor and rich subjects in all periods. In line
with the results of previous experiments (e.g., Cherry et al. 2005;Buckley
and Croson 2006), poor subjects contribute in 𝐵𝐴 a larger share of their
endowment than rich subjects do. Conversely, in 𝐶𝐴 the relative contribu-
tions of poor and rich are similar. Evidence to this is provided in Table 2
were we model the temporal pattern of 𝑐𝑖,𝑡/𝑒𝑖,𝑡: the coeﬃcient of the en-
dowment dummy is signiﬁcant in the 𝐵𝐴 data regression but insigniﬁcant in
the 𝐶𝐴 data regression.4 The communicator directs the players’ attention
away from an equal (in absolute terms) contributions rule, and successfully
evokes a coordination rule prescribing contributions that equalize ﬁnal pay-
oﬀs.5 In particular, 10 out of the 16 communicators suggest in their ﬁrst
period messages that all group members should contribute their whole en-
dowment. Rich as well as poor subjects adhere to these suggestions in 80%
of the cases.
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
4 Conclusions
Past studies dealt with one-way communication as an institution that fos-
ters contributions in symmetric VCMs. This paper demonstrates that the
coordination role of the communicator is robust to situations where indi-
viduals are heterogeneously endowed. Our interpretation of this ﬁnding is
that the communicator switches the people’s attention away from an equal
contributions rule. He promotes instead an equal payoﬀs rule, in particular
the rule that is leading to the highest jointly attainable payoﬀ.
4Table 2 presents parsimonious models that optimize the Bayesian information crite-
rion. Yet, our claim that the coeﬃcient of the endowment dummy becomes insigniﬁcant
when we switch to the 𝐶𝐴 dataset remains valid for alternative regression speciﬁcations.
5In 𝐵𝐴 the median contribution of both poor and rich subjects equals 10, whereas in
𝐶𝐴 it equals 20 for the poor and 30 for the rich. See Van Dijk and Wilke (1995) and
Van Dijk et al. (1999) for studies showing that participants in resource dilemmas prefer
an equal payoﬀs rule.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 094Table 1: Summary statistics of average group contributions.
Mean Standard deviation Median Median absolute deviation
𝐵𝐴 10.66 5.47 10.75 6.67
𝐶𝐴 19.73 7.47 25.00 0.00
Note: 160 observations per treatment.
8
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 094Table 2: Random-eﬀects Tobit regression results for relative con-
tributions to the public good.
𝐵𝐴 𝐶𝐴
constant 0.282 (0.000) 0.056 (0.797)
𝑡 −0.035 (0.000) 0.195 (0.000)
𝑡2 −0.032 (0.000)
𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 −0.168 (0.001) −0.111 (0.501)
∑4
𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗,𝑡−1/𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1
4 0.807 (0.000) 1.790 (0.000)
Wald test 199.89 (0.000) 99.94 (0.000)
Note: The dependent variable is 𝑐𝑖,𝑡/𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (576 observations grouped by sub-
ject). 𝑡 stands for trend; 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 equals 0 for the poor and 1 for the
rich. The last independent variable represents the average of the relative
contributions of the group in the previous period. The 𝐵𝐴 (𝐶𝐴) regression
involves 91 (53) left-censored and 74 (401) right-censored observations.
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Figure 1: Mean of average group contributions over time.
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Figure 2: Average relative contributions of poor and rich subjects over time.
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